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Abstract
Mckenzie  econometrically  ascertains the determinants  of  above.  I)efaiilt to these other creditor groups call  b
default to  the International  Banlk for Reconstruction  ancd  explained  by more traditional  country  risk variables.
Development  (IBRD) through  panel logit analysis.  -,r'  l  Mckenzie's analysis highiights the imiportatcre
Creditworthiness with a lag of one  period is determined  of political and external  factors in explaining default to
by  the extent of arrears  to private creditors, the  all creditors  studied. He finds sovereign  default to bc a
proportioti of total debt service  that is being paid,  the  state-dependenit  process,  whereby  the repayment
government  budget deficit,  the extent of military  behavior of a country changes opce it enters into default.
involvement in the government of a country,  and by the  Operationally,  Mckenzie  arrives at a model that can be
G7's current account balance.  used  to assess  short-term creditworthiness,  althou,gh data
Default to the IBRD falls into a graduated hierarchy,  imperfectionis  and availability  still limit the usefulness of
whereby  default occurs first to Paris Club and  the model  for some countries.  Longer-term  risk
commercial  bank creditors, -with subsequent  default  assessment proves rnore difficult, which  raises
f  by portfolios with high proportions of IBRD  operational  questions for the  iBRD.
and short-term debt. as well as the factors mention.ed
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Default  to  the  IBRD  is  a  rare  phenomenon  that is  seen  by many  to  arise  purely  from
idiosyncratic,  mainly  political,  shocks,  in  contrast  to  defaults  to  bilateral  and  private
creditors, where economic  events are deemed to play a greater role. In this study we carry
out  a thorough  investigation  of this premise,  using  panel  logit  econometric  models  to
investigate  the  determinants  of IBRD  default.  We  also  model  default  to  Paris  Club
creditors and to commercial banks in order to determine the degree of commonality in the
determinants  of default  across  creditor  groups,  and  to investigate  the  plausibility  of a
graduated hierarchy  of default,  whereby default to the IBRD occurs only after default to
other creditors.  Within  this framework the aim is to ascertain  the factors which determine
whether  a country will fall into default to the IBRD following  default to other creditors.
Operationally  we wish to arrive at a model that can be using in assessing country risk as
it pertains to IBRD default.
Empirical  models  have been used  for country  risk analysis  since  the mid-1970's,  with
probit  and  logit  models  emerging  as  the  preferred  estimation  technique.  However,
attention  has  tended to  remain  focused  on  default  to  a broad  group  of creditors,  with
separate  analysis  of debt repayment  to international  organizations  seemingly  neglected.
Aylward  and  Thorne  (1998)  address  repayment  performance  to  the  International
Monetary  Fund and find that indicators of credit history with the Fund,  together with a
small number of macroeconomic  variables yield a significant model of the probability of
a country incurring  arrears  to the Fund. We carry out a similar exercise for arrears to the
IBRD.  However our methodology  is somewhat different with a more indepth analysis of
issues of state dependence  and the use of random effects models  where  appropriate.  We
also consider many more determinants of default in our analysis,  in particular providing a
more  detailed modelling  of the  importance  of political  and external  factors.  Our work
further contributes  to the existing literature through its explicit consideration  of a default
hierarchy.
The remainder of this section describes the history of sovereign default to the IBRD over
the period  1980-99, comparing  it to defaults  to  other creditors  over this time.  Section 2
briefly summarizes  several theories of default,  Section 3 describes  the variables  used in
this study  and Section 4 carries  out exploratory  analysis  of this data, comparing means,
correlations  and  carrying  out  principal  components  analysis.  Section  5 outlines  the
econometric  models used in this paper.  Section  6 provides the core content of the paper,
reporting the results of econometric  analysis of default to the IBRD, Paris Club Creditors
and  Commercial  Banks.  In  this  section  we  also  model  IBRD  default  as  a  two-step
process,  whereby  debtors  default  to  the  IBRD  only  after  default  to  less-preferred
creditors.  Finally  Section  7 concludes,  highlighting  the  key  findings  and  their policy
implications.
l Aylward and Thome use two year-dependent  dummy variables to account for extemal  events. In their
statistical appendix there is some consideration of the role of political factors, but they do not develop a
link between political factors and Fund arrears in their econometric models.
21.1.  IBRD Default History
Figure  1 details  the history of IBRD nonaccruals  up  to the end of April  1999.  The  first
default  occurred  in  1985,  and  we  see  that during  the  late  1980's  there  was  a  rash of
subsequent  defaults,  peaking  with  9  countries,  representing  4.13%  of the  IBRD  loan
portfolio,  in  nonaccrual  status  in  1989.  The  1990's  have  been  characterized  by  a
declining share of nonaccrual  loans in the overall IBRD loan portfolio, and a fairly steady
number  of countries  in nonaccrual.  This  illustrates  the fact that default to the IBRD  is a
rare phenomenon, and thus we will not have all that many cases of defaults from which to
draw our conclusions.
Figurel: IBRD history of Nonaccrual  1984-99
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Source: Finance Credit Risk (FINCR) records, The World Bank.
Over  the  past  10-15  years  the  heavily  indebted  poor  countries  have  experienced  a
withdrawal  of  private  lenders  and  have  become  increasingly  dependent  on  official
financing,  with  multilateral  institutions  becoming  the  main  source  of loan  finance  for
most  low-income  countries.  The World  Bank is  the  largest multilateral  lender,  with its
share  in  total  multilateral  debt  of developing  countries  exceeding  50 percent  in  1996.
(IMF,  1998).  Much of this  lending  has  occurred  on concessional  terms,  in  the  form  of
IDA credits. Figure 2 shows the shares of IBRD loans and all Multilateral loans in Total
debt stocks over the period 1980-97,  averaged over the 63 IBRD borrowers in our sample
for which we had data for each year in this period.  We  see the rise in the importance of
multilateral  loans  over this  period,  but  with the  share  of IBRD  loans  falling  over the
1990's.
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Figure  2 shows unweighted  average  share  for the  63  IBRD borrowers in our sample for which we have
observations over the entire period  1980-97. Source: World Debt Tables/Global l)evelopment Finance.
1.2.  Default to Other Creditors
Figure 3a compares  the number of countries  in default  to the IBRD with the number  of
countries in default to the Paris  Club and to Commercial Banks over the period  1981-98,
where  default to  the latter two institutions  will be  defined precisely  in Section  3.5. We
see that defaults  to Commercial  Banks  appear to precede  defaults  to the Paris  Club by
roughly two years, with the number of countries defaulting  to either institution following
the  same  pattern  - a  rising  number  during  the  1980's,  and  decline during  the  1990s.
Defaults to the IBRD  did not begin to rise until after Paris Club  and Commercial  Bank
defaults  had  already begun  to increase,  but  reach  a peak  at around  the  same  time  as
defaults  to  the  Paris  Club.  The  more  serious  implications  of default  to  the  IBRD  are
reflected in the relatively small number of countries in nonaccrual  status  to the IBRD as
compared  to the  other  creditors.  This may  also help  explain  why the  number of IBRD
nonaccruals  do not decline in tandem with the number of defaults to the other creditors.
The likelihood  of default to other creditors  may differ  markedly  from the  likelihood  of
default to the IBRD for certain  countries.  This may reflect a low level of exposure by the
IBRD, with  most of the country's  debt coming  from  other sources.  Secondly  one must
realize the more political nature  of IBRD default.  Political forces  can raise or lower the
likelihood  of default.  On  one  hand,  an  unstable  political  environment  and  deliberate
political acts can make default more likely. In contrast, with countries that are considered
to have  systemic importance  there is a greater likelihood that in times of trouble a rescue
package  will  be  put  into  place  by  major  creditor  governments,  which  protects  the
international  financial  institutions  as  a  by-product.  Rescue  packages  to  Mexico,
Indonesia,  South  Korea and Brazil  following recent crises  in these countries  are a good
example of this occurring.
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Source:  Tables A3.2, A2.3 Global Development Finance  1999: Analysis and Summary Tables.  Washington
DC, The World Bank and  FINCR internal records.
Figure  3b  shows  the  number  of countries  going into  default  in  a given  year,  which  is
arguably  the phenomenon  of most interest.  We  see the effects  of the Debt Crisis of the
early  1980's, with the a large number of countries entering  into default with Commercial
Banks  and the Paris  Club creditors  in  1982 and  1983.  The upsurge  in IBRD defaults  did
not occur until 1987-88, five years later, with a second peak in defaults in  1993 caused by
the separation  of forrner Yugoslavia.  We see that to reconcile IBRD default with default
to the other creditor groups one needs to carefully consider issues of timing.
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Given  that  the  number  of  countries  defaulting  to  the  IBRD,  the  Paris  Club  and  to
Commercial  Banks is at a level much lower than the giddying heights  of the late  1980's,
one may question the need for a study determining  the proximate  causes of such default
at the present  time. However, to the contrary, we suggest that this is precisely the time to
carry out such analysis,  as only after having observed a period where countries  are going
into  default,  and  a period  where  countries  are  leaving  default  status,  can  we hope  to
discover the  true  relationship between  default and the plethora  of explanatory  variables
used in the literature.  Moreover,  events following the East Asian, Russian,  and Brazilian
crises of 1997-98 together with a recent crop of Paris Club reschedulings have once again
turned our attention to the issue of sovereign default.
2.  Theoretical Explanations of Sovereign  Default
Cline (1984) highlights  the fact that there are two  sides to a debt rescheduling,  or in our
case to a  default on an IBRD loan.  The "demand"  side reflects  the  decision of a country
to seek rescheduling or to go into nonaccrual  status. Such a decision has an adverse effect
on  a  country's  credit  rating,  reducing  the  ability to borrow  in  the future  at  favourable
terms,  so  a  country  will  reschedule  only  if the  opportunity  cost  of continued  debt
servicing  is perceived  by policymakers  to  be prohibitively  high.  This view of default  is
described by Ul Haque et al. (1996)  as  the "cost-benefit"  approach,  as countries contrast
the costs of rescheduling  or default against the benefit windfall  gain.  Cline suggests this
demand  for  rescheduling  will  depend  on  the  debt-service  ratio,  ratio  of reserves  to
imports,  rate of per capita income growth,  level of per capita income and on the current
account deficit.  Countries  incur sovereign debt for consumption-smoothing  purposes,  for
investment  purposes  given  an  expectation  of  relatively  high  productivity,  and  for
adjustrnent  purposes,  based  on  current  account  sustainability.  Ul  Haque  et  al.  then
6consider  the costs  of rescheduling  in  terms  of the  inability  to borrow  further  to satisfy
these  motives  for  borrowing.  In  addition  to  the  variables  considered  by  Cline,  they
consider  the inflation rate,  export growth rate,  terms  of trade  and real  exchange  rate to
indicate  the benefits  to  be  had  from  incurring  sovereign  debt,  and  hence  the  costs  of
default.  The second  side  consists of factors explaining  the "supply"  of rescheduling,  or
the  nonsupply  of foreign  credit.  These  factors  include  both  screening  criteria  which
creditors use to judge a country's creditworthiness  and  the influence  of the international
economic  environment,  which determines  overall  international  lending.  A reduced  form
equation is then estimated, which reflects  the joint effect of these demand and supply side
influences.  As  IBRD  loans  are  of medium  to  longer  term  maturities  on  average,  we
presume  that  the  default  decision  is  separable  from  the  initial  borrowing  decision,
enabling us to not have to consider game-theoretic  analysis of strategic borrowing.
The second broad theoretical  approach  to sovereign  default  risk is denoted by Ul Haque
et  al.  (1996)  as  the  "debt-service  capacity"  approach.  In  contrast  to  the  cost-benefit
approach,  default is not seen as arising from a calculated cost-benefit  analysis, but rather
as  due  to  an  unintended  deterioration  of  the  borrower's  capacity  to  service  its  debt.
Default  then  arises  from  short-term  illiquidity  or  longer-term  insolvency  manifesting
itself in  liquidity problems.  The result  is  a breach  of the  debtor  nation's  intertemporal
budget constraint, which is then explained by domestic economic  factors  and/or external
shocks.  Again a reduced  form equation  is  estimated,  relating the occurrence  of default to
factors causing the inability of a nation to service its debt.
One can  argue for the inclusion of many of the  same variables  in  a model  pertaining to
either of the two approaches  outlined  above,  and indeed many of the  factors which drive
a country to breach its intertemporal  budget  constraint also increase  the opportunity cost
of a  nation  continuing  to  meet  its  debt  servicing  requirements.  Nonetheless,  a  clear
distinction between  the two viewpoints  of default  can be  made through  consideration  of
political factors.  Political risk will matter under the debt-service  capacity approach  only
in  so far as it results in economic  mismanagement  and hence  impacts on debt-servicing
ability.  In contrast,  under the cost-benefit  approach  politics matters  not only  through  its
influence  on  the ability  to pay,  but also through  its determination  of the willingness  to
meet  debt  servicing  requirements.  We  discuss  this  issue  further  when  we  address  the
question of how one can measure political risk.
3.  Selection  of Variables
Our study is over the period  1980-98  for the list of 81  IBRD borrowers given in Table  1.
Data availability then determined  the number of countries,  and observations per country,
which were used in estimation.  The  dependent variable,  denoted  Yit, is a binary indicator
of whether or not a specific  country i is in default to the IBRD in a specific  year t, where
default occurs when a country enters nonaccrual  status with the IBRD. Nonaccrual status
occurs when  a country  is  180 days  or more  late in  terms of  IBRD  debt repayment.  The
choice of explanatory  variables was guided by the theoretical  discussion  in the preceding
section, and by the existing literature on sovereign debt repayment.  In particular,  Table  I
in Aylward and Thorne  (1998,  p1 1) provides a succinct summary  of the variables  tested
in many of the major studies of this literature,  and we supplemented  the list of variables
7given there with other variables  suggested by theory. We also consider variables specific
to  the  IBRD  in  accordance  with  Aylward  and  Thorne's  finding  that  Fund-specific
variables were important in explaining arrears to the IMF. The list of  variables  considered
is much  longer than most of the previous  literature,  and  reflects  our desire  to attain  a
robust specification.  We discuss the variables pertaining to  economic risk, political risk,
rescheduling  history,  and the  external  environment  below,  with  emphasis  on  the  areas
where our choice of variables differs from or develops the existing literature.
3.1.  Economic  Risk Factors
The choice  of economic risk factors  in much of the literature on external debt repayment
has been guided by the results of an influential study, by Avramovic  et al. (1964), of the
factors  influencing  a country's  ability  to service  its  external  debt.  They  identify  short-
term  liquidity factors,  or traditional  debt and financial  ratios, and longer-term  indicators
of economic health  and growth.  It is possible that despite  good,  or improving  economic
fundamentals  a developing country may be forced into a liquidity crisis if its reserves are
insufficient,  or  its  solvency  situation  is precarious,  and  as  such  these traditional  debt
ratios are likely to directly influence default. In contrast,  structural variables reflecting the
long-term  economic health of the country are generally  not direct causes  of default, but
countries with poor fundamentals are more  likely to develop  economic problems that do
bring  on  default.  [Dym,  1997]  This  suggests the  need to  consider  longer time  lags  of
these variables.  The literature  survey  of Aylward and Thorne  (1998)  suggests that it is
the debt and  financial ratios that most consistently  seem to be significant. They also find
past repayment  history to be important,  but that the inclusion of the  lagged  dependent
variable  or  other  indicators  of historical  creditworthiness  tends  to  render  insignificant
many of the other independent macroeconomic  variables.
Table 2 lists all the variables used in this study. We group the economic risk factors  into
four  categories:  Debt and  financial  ratios, Resource  Availability,  Economic  Conditions
and  Structural  Factors,  and  Economic  Policy  Indicators.  Debt  and  financial  ratios
pertaining  to  Official,  Multilateral  and  IBRD  Debt  are  considered  alongside  the
traditional ratios  for total debt stock. We discuss the variables that are not transparent or
present difficulties of measurement  in the next section.
3.1.1.  Data on Debt Service Due
Historical information  on debt service due is not available in an easily accessible  format
from  any of the standard sources.  However projected  debt due  for the following  year is
reported annually in  the World Debt Tables/Global Development Finance Reports of the
World Bank. Prior to  1991  these debt due projections  are broken down into Principal and
Interest due to Private and Official Creditors; from 1991  onwards one can obtain debt due
to Comnnercial  Banks and to Multilateral Creditors. The advantage of these projections  is
that the  information is available annually and takes account of rescheduling agreements.
A possible disadvantage  is that the projections may be subject to error,  and furthermore
interest rates changes may mean that debt service  due differs from projected debt service
due.  To investigate the accuracy of the debt service due projections, we compared  debt
8service  paid  to  debt  service  due  for the  non-defaulting  countries  in  our  sample.  Some
countries prepay their debt, hence  even in the absence of errors and  interest changes  we
would not expect debt paid and debt due to be the same for all non-default countries. We
compared the projections  from the World Bank with  those of the OECD,  and found the
latter to not be nearly as  accurate.  Furthermore,  using these projections  is, in  our view,
superior  to the  approach  used by  Aylward  and Thorne  (1998)  who  add  arrears  to total
debt service paid, which does not allow for debt reschedulings,  and adds a stock variable
to  a  flow  variable.  The  result  is  that  their measure  vastly  inflates  the  amount  of debt
service due  for countries  with large  arrears going back in time. It is not surprising, thus,
that their measure of debt service due is highly correlated with arrears,  and thus "default"
which they define  in terms of arrears.
In addition  to  the  standard  debt service  to  exports  ratios,  we  consider the  ratio  of debt
service  paid  to  debt  service  due  for  total,  official  and  private  debt,  as  explanatory
variables.  The  motivation  for considering  these  ratios  is  that  a  variety  of factors  may
make  a  given  debt  to  exports  ratio  sustainable  in  one  country,  but  not  in  another.
Examples  include  differences  in tariff rates,  foreign investment  and  international  grants.
The debt paid/due ratios enable us to look directly at the ability of a country to service  all
its  liabilities,  with  a  country  that  is  not  paying  all  the  amount  due  to  other  creditors
perhaps  more  likely  to  default  to  the  IBRD.  We  capped  the  ratio  at  100%,  as  data
inaccuracies  are responsible  for most of the over 100%  ratios,  and the key information  is
whether a country is meeting its payments or not, not whether it is prepaying.2
3.2.  Political  Risk
The creditworthiness  of a sovereign nation depends on both the government's ability and
its  willingness to repay  its debt  commitments.  The  economic  factors  considered  above
address  the  ability  of  a  country  to  repay;  political  risk  addresses  the  willingness.  As
Reuss(1996)  notes, willingness  is a key factor  that distinguishes  sovereign  credits  from
other  types  of credits,  as  creditors  have only  limited  legal  redress  when,  for political
reasons,  a  sovereign  government  chooses  not  to  repay  its  debt  in  time  even though  it
possesses  the  means.  In  a cross-sectional  study Brewer  and Rivoli  (1990)  examine  the
effects  of politics  on perceived  country  creditworthiness,  as  measured by  country  risk
ratings,  secondary  market  debt  prices  and  risk premiums  charged  on  sovereign  loans.
Their  results  suggest  that  political  variables  are  at  least  as  important  as  economic
variables  in  explaining  perceived  creditworthiness,  with  regime  instability  having  a
stronger  impact  than either the  extent  of democracy  or the  presence  of armed conflict,
and recent political conditions being more significant than a longer-term  political history.
In  contrast,  Lee  (1993)  uses  the  same  political  variables  and  a  different  subset  of
economic variables,  and finds that banker's  credit ratings  appear  to assign larger  weight
to  economic  variables  than  to  political  instability  variables.  Nonetheless,  they  still find
the  frequency  of changes  in  the regime  and  armed  conflict  to  have  an impact  on credit
ratings.  Both these  studies  offer  only  cross-sectional  comparisons  across  countries,  and
do not investigate the effect of political variables in a panel framework.
2 In addition we also tried dividing the data into 0-20%,  20-40%, 40-60%,  60-80%, 80-100% divisions,  and
using a variable  coded  I through  5 for these  divisions,  as  a further check  of accuracy.  The results proved
robust under this altemative measure.
9Brewer  and Rivoli  (1990)  discuss the  means by  which political  risk  and instability  can
affect  a  country's  general  creditworthiness.  They  suggest that  unstable  regimes  divert
resources  into  forms  of wealth  that  are  easier  to  protect  than  long-term  investments,
weaken  a government's  ability to  extract the  necessary  resources  from its  citizens,  and
increase investor uncertainty. Furthermore,  unstable political conditions can often prevent
sound  economic  management.  If the  result  is  that  country's  with  unstable  political
systems  have difficulties  attracting  external  financing,  they may be  more reliant on the
IBRD  to obtain  funds  in the  first  place.  Then if economic  conditions  force  default,  if
IBRD debt forms a greater share of the portfolio  of a more politically unstable country,
ceteris paribus, default  on  IBRD  debt  is  more  likely  to  occur.  In  this  circumstance,
default on the IBRD debt is not in itself a political act, merely political  conditions result
in IBRD  debt being  one  of the few  forns of external  financing  available.  We  examine
this hypothesis by considering  the interaction between  political conditions  and the share
of IBRD debt, and multilateral debt in general3, in total debt outstanding.
We might expect political factors to have an even stronger impact on a country's decision
to default to the IBRD. The IBRD's status as a preferred creditor and its role as a catalyst
in attracting financing for countries  from other creditors  suggest that a country would be
likely  to  emphasize  meeting  its  financial  obligations  to the  IBRD  ahead  of those  to
bilateral  or commercial  creditors.  Therefore  if default  does  occur,  it may result from  a
deliberate  political  act,  arising  from political  tensions between  the defaulter  nation  and
the nations  with the larger controlling shares  in the World Bank.  That is nations may be
particularly  unwilling to  repay  the  IBRD,  even  if they  are  able  to  repay  some  other
creditors.
It is likely that political  factors therefore  impact on both ability and willingness  to repay,
and  we  can  try  and  separate  the  two  effects  by  considering  the  interaction  between
political variables  and  economic  conditions.  This  enables  us to distinguish between  the
cost-benefit and debt-capacity capacity approaches discussed in the theoretical  overview.
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  proliferation  of data  measuring  various  aspects  of
governance. 4 However,  the  majority  of  these  series  are  of  relatively  recent  origin,
preventing their use in our study.  Political Risk Services (PRS) produces the Intemational
Country Risk Guide (ICRG),  which has  compiled monthly data on a variety of political,
financial and economic risk factors  since  1982.5 In addition to a total political  risk score,
they  also  provide  scores  for  12  components  of political  risk,  which  are  described  in
Appendix  1. This  detailed  breakdown  of the political  risk index  enables  us to examine
which , if any, of the dimensions of political risk have most impact on sovereign default.
3  The argument for considering all multilateral debt is that default to the IBRD may not be considered more
detrimental than default to other multilaterals,  so that if  a country has a high multilateral debt to total debt
ratio, it may be more likely to default on a proportion of all multilateral debt, including debt to the IBRD.
4 Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999a)  describe a new database containing over 300 governance
indicators  compiled  from  a  variety  of sources.  In  a  related  paper  (1999b)  they  utilize  a variant  of an
unobserved components model to combine this information into aggregate governance indicators.  As these
data series get longer,  it may be preferable to use their indices in the model.
5 We used data from 1984 onwards  due to comparability issues with the 1982-83  data.
103.3.  External Conditions
World economic  factors,  exogenous to an individual developing country,  are just as often
neglected  as political factors  in studies  explaining  sovereign  default, yet it is  likely they
are an  important  consideration.  Cline  (1984)  considers  the  role of the  global  supply  of
lending, as  measured by total net external borrowing  by all non-oil developing countries
as  a fraction  of total  imports  and finds  it  to  have  a  significant  negative  effect  on the
likelihood  of an  individual  country  restructuring.  A  reduction  in  the  global  supply  of
lending, as  occurred following  the  1982 debt crisis, makes it more difficult for countries
to  service  their  debt,  whereas  a  large  surge  in  lending,  such  as  that  resulting  from
petrodollar  recycling  in  the  mid-1970s,  may  prevent  reschedulings  or  defaults  that
otherwise would have been expected to occur.
In  addition  to  their  effect  on the  global  supply  of lending,  external  factors  may  also
impact  on repayment costs,  through changes  in the real LIBOR rates  and on a country's
exports  and per capita income,  through world business cycle  effects  on  import demand.
Hajivassiliou  (1989)  considers the volume of import demand by industrialized countries,
inflation in the OECD countries,  and world interest rates, but finds these variables  to have
no  significant  explanatory  power after  a  country's  flow  of exports  and  the  amount  of
interest  repayments  are controlled  for.  We consider three  external  economic  factors:  the
three month real LIBOR interest rate6, the G7 current account balance7 as a percentage of
GDP  and the deviation of OECD per capita  GNP growth  from 2%. This last variable  is
intended  to  measure  the business  cycle  in OECD  countries,  with  growth  appearing  to
trend  around a  2%  level.  Figure 4 shows  the G7  Current Account Balance  to GDP and
OECD  Business  Cycle  over the  sample period.  We  see  the G7  current  account  deficit
increased through the early  1980's,  and  falls throughout the 1990's. The Business Cycle
is  indeed  cyclical,  with  lower  than  2%  growth  occurring  at  the  start  of the  1980's,
followed by a period of faster growth, another decline in the early 1990's, and faster than
average  growth once more at the end of the  1990's.
6  We considered three different deflators of the nominal LIBOR rate: Industrial inflation, the annual
percentage change in all developing  country Export Unit Values (EUVs), and the annual  change in the non-
oil developing country EWVs.  Deflating by either of the EUVs gives a much more volatile real interest rate
series than deflating by industrial inflation, and we find the industrial inflation deflated LIBOR rate to be
preferable in our analysis.
7 In calculating G7 current account balance/GDP percentages and OECD per capita GNP growth rates we
weighted individual country figures by the share of that country's  GNP in total G7 or OECD GNP,
reflecting the differences  in the global importance of individual economies.
11Finally one may consider contagion effects resulting from the presence of other countries
defaulting.  A country's  default may make  it more  likely that other developing  countries
will  default  through  several  channels.  Firstly,  it  may  reduce  the  political  costs  and
reputation effects of defaulting,  as other countries are  also defaulting.  Secondly, once one
country  defaults,  this is likely to have a detrimental effect on the availability  of external
funds to other developing countries  and hence on their debt-servicing ability. We attempt
to  account  for  such  effects  by  means  of  a  variable  indicating  the  number  of other
countries defaulting in the current  period.8 We use defaults both to the IBRD, and to the
Paris Club for ffiis purpose.
Figure 4: G7 CA Balance/GDP  and
OECD  Business Cycle
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Source:  World Development Indicators  1999 CDROM,  Washington DC, The World Bank.
3.4.  Arrears history
Default or nonaccrual on an IBRD loan is said to occur when a country is more than  180
days  in arrears on its payments.  Before this  occurs,  loans with arrears  exceeding  shorter
periods also have consequences  for countries  - for example after 60 days, disbursements
are suspended on outstanding loans.9 One might suspect that the frequency  with which a
country goes into arrears  of shorter  periods could be  a harbinger of future  defaults,  and
hence  our intention  was to  include  some  form of repayments  history as an explanatory
B This  eliminates  the  endogeneity  problem  which  would  occur  if we  used  total  number  of defaulting
countries in the given year.
9  Prior to July I t, 1991, a suspension warning was issued after 60 days, with disbursements  suspended after
75 days, the new cut-off dates are 45 days and 60 days respectively.
12variable.  However,  as of July  1  "  1991,  changes  were  made  in the  arrears policies  of the
IBRD,  and  detailed  data  is  only  available  for  the  period  following  this  change.
Furthermore,  for  the  first  few  post-change  years,  poor  payment  performance  was
primarily  due to  information  gaps  and/or  specific  institutional  bottlenecks,  as  countries
struggled  to  adapt  to  the  new  threshold  periods.  Consequently  the  non-default  arrears
record of a country could not be incorporated into the panel analysis.
3.5.  Official  and Commercial Debt Restructuring
Given the  serious  consequences  to  a country's  creditworthiness  standing  which occurs
when it defaults to the IBRD,  one might think that countries would first  default on loans
to other  official  creditors  first.  Rescheduling  of intergovernmental  loans  and  officially
guaranteed  private  export credits  takes place  under the aegis  of the Paris Club.  To make
the  debt  relief  effective,  debtor  countries  must  sign  bilateral  agreements  with  each
creditor. One might expect, a  priori, that such agreements may be an indicator of possible
default to the IBRD in the future, both because they represent a worsening  debt-servicing
ability,  and  also  because  the  act  of defaulting  to  Paris  Club creditors  may reduce  the
supply  of credit  available,  and  hence  further  exacerbate  repayment  problems.  On  the
other  hand,  an  IMF  program  must  be  in place  for  a  Paris  Club  meeting  to  occur,  a
condition  of which  is no  arrears  to  multilaterals.  If the  Fund  program  is  successful  in
improving  economic  conditions,  this  may then reduce  the  likelihood  of default.  Hence
prior rescheduling of official debt may have opposing effects  on the probability  of IBRD
default.  Analysis  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  countries  may  repeatedly
reschedule  their debt,  rescheduling  agreements  may treat either  the  flow or the stock  of
debt,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of rescheduling  arrangements  may  vary.'0 These
concerns prevent us  considering  the amount rescheduled  as an explanatory  variable,  and
instead we consider the incidence of rescheduling.
Both  debt  reschedulings  and  "significant  arrears"  have  been  used  as  the  dependent
variable in the literature.  Cline (1984, p207)  notes that "arrears  in themselves,  especially
if minor  or temporary,  pose  no special  systemic  problem",  whereas  debt reschedulings
"mark  a  major  qualitative  break  in  the  spectrum  of erosion",  and  hence  represent  an
appropriate  threshold  of severity  for  analysis.  Rescheduling  worsens  a country's  credit
rating,  potentially  raising  the  cost  of  borrowing,  and  so  countries  will  not  seek
rescheduling  lightly;  instead Cline argues  they will be  likely to  enter into a  sequence  of
arrears,  temporary  moratorium,  and  then  reschedule  only  if the  opportunity  cost  of
continuing  normal  debt  servicing  is  perceived  to be  prohibitively  high.  We  use  both
reschedulings  to Paris Club creditors, and to Commercial Banks in this paper.  Concluding
and signing bilateral agreements  can take one  year or more,  so than when an agreement
occurs,  we  attempt  to  resolve  the  lag  between  the  request  for  a  rescheduling  and the
eventual  signing of such  an  agreement  by  appropriate  adjustment  of the  starting  date.
Feder,  Just  and Ross  (1981)  note  that  there  are  instances  where  debt is  rearranged  or
deferred  for some  length  of time  without  publicity,  and  including  them  in  the  sample
without  properly  considering  them  as  de facto  reschedulings  of debt  may  distort  the
10  See Table  A3.2  in  the Global Development Finance. Analysis and Summary Tables 1999,  The World
Bank for a summary of rescheduling agreements  and conditions,  1980-98.
13estimates.  To mitigate this problem we use information  on debt restructuring agreements
from the Institute of International Finance, in addition to Bank/Fund sources.
We  define  "default"  to  Paris  Club  creditors  or  to  Commercial  Banks  as  a  situation
whereby  a  country  is unable  to meet the current  terms of its debt  servicing,  and hence
requires a rescheduling  agreement.  The general principle for determining the emergence
of "default"  was  to use the contract  cutoff date for multilateral  debt agreements  with
official  creditors,  and  the  start  date  of  the  consolidation  period  for  rescheduling
agreements  with commercial banks, adjusting these dates as necessary.  A country  is then
said to remain  in "default"  status  until  it is  able  to  meet  payments  on the rescheduled
terms without requiring a subsequent rescheduling at the end of the period covered by the
current agreement.  The exit date for "default" is thus taken as the end date of the period
covered  by  an  agreement,  provided  that  it  is  followed  by  a immediate  period  of no
rescheduling. For example, Argentina had rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club in
1985,  1987,  1991  and  1992, covering the period from  10 Dec.  1983 through Mar.  1995.
We  thus  treat  Argentina  as  "defaulting"  to  the  Paris  Club  in  1983,  and  remaining  in
"default"  status  until  1995,  rather than treating  each  separate  agreement  as an  isolated
case  to be  used  as  the  dependent  variable.  This  treatment  reflects  our  belief that  the
crucial  information  of interest  is  when  a  country  first required  its  debt  service  to be
rescheduled,  and the  duration of the  subsequent  period.  A country  is not deemed to be
creditworthy if it is in "default" status.
4.  Exploratory Analysis
4.1.  Comparison of Means
Table 2 compares  the  group of countries which defaulted  on their IBRD  loans, at some
time during the sample period  1981-98,  with the group of  IBRD borrowers  which never
entered  into nonaccrual  status.  A Welch  test  for equality  of means" 1 is reported  for the
explanatory  variables  used  in  this  study,  which  allows  for  the  two  groups  to  have
different  variances.  Means  are  taken  over  the  period  1980-97,  as  we aim  to  associate
lagged  variables  with  current  default.  The  financial  ratios,  all  the  political  variables
except  religion  in  politics,  and  rescheduling  histories  with  the  Paris  Club  or  with
commercial  banks all differ  greatly across  the two groups.  Amongst the other categories,
we  see  that  reserves  to  imports,  gross  national  savings  to  GNP,  the  current  account
balance,  GNP per capita,  inflation,  and government  revenue and  expenditure  also  have
highly significant differences  in mean, whereas  the two  groups of countries  do not differ
significantly in terms of export ratios, nor in changes in the terms of trade,  exchange rate
or M2/GDP.  GNP per capita  growth  is  significantly  different,  whereas  GDP growth  is
not,  indicating that population  growth was  higher in the defaulting  countries.  Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests that the two groups are from the same distribution1 2 yielded  similar results
to the tests for equality of means for the majority of the variables  considered here
" There is  a case to be made for one-sided tests for many of the variables, given  that theory tells us a  priori
the  signs  of many of the differences.  The  large magnitude  of the  t-values  for most of the  differences  in
means signifies that this distinction is  not important empirically.
12  Comparison  of means  may  be  misleading  in  the  presence  of large  outliers,  hence  a  comparison  of
distributions, which includes, inter alia, comparison of medians, is  a useful complement to the analysis.
14These comparisons  between default  and non-default  countries  show  the key  dimensions
by which these  two groups of countries  differ, but tells us little about the changes within
a  country  which  lead  it  to  default.  The  final  column of Table  2  gives  the correlation
between  the  lagged  variables  and the  dependent  variable  Yit,  our  indicator  of IBRD
nonaccrual  status.  Thus  the correlations  look at the relationship  between  the  occurrence
of default and  the explanatory  variables,  whereas  the Welch  tests compare  the group of
defaulting countries to the group of non-defaulters.  These correlations  fail to account for
interrelationships  between  multiple variables,  or across  time, but  nonetheless  provide  a
first pass  at the  sign and  magnitude  of the relationship  between  the  respective  variable
and  IBRD  default  in  the  subsequent  year.'3 It is  interesting  to note  that the  strongest
correlations  are  between  financial  variables  - Total  Debt  Service  Paid/Due,  Total
debt/Exports,  Total  arrears/Total  debt  and  inflation  - and  default,  with  some  of the
political variables also having reasonably strong correlations.
4.2.  Correlation and Principal Component Analysis
In order to  attain  a parsimonious  set of predictors  we first  attempt  to identify  the main
dimensions  of the data  set through correlation  and principal  components  analysis.  With
46  variables  to  consider,  we  do  not  present  all  the  two-way  correlations,  but  instead
choose  to  focus  on  correlations  within  different  subsets  of variables,  by grouping  the
variables  into  Debt  and  Financial  Ratios,  Resource  Availability  indicators,  variables
concerning  Economic  Conditions  and  Structural  Factors  in  the  Economy,  Economic
Policy  Indicators,  Political  Risk  Factors,  Rescheduling  History  and External  Economic
Conditions.  Table  3 reports  these  intra-group  correlations;  the only  correlation  greater
than  0.6  between  variables  in different  groups  is  the correlation  of 0.628  between the
inflation rate and the exchange  rate depreciation,  which could just as easily be included in
the  same group.  Only  correlations  greater than 0.3  are reported in the table,  for ease  in
identifying  the key  correlations.  The  most notable  correlations between  individual pairs
of variables  are between  Total  debt service  due/Exports  and Total  debt/Exports  (.850),
and between  Exports/GDP  and Imports/GDP  (.866). We note that many of the financial
ratios show some correlation,  and most of the political risk variables are highly correlated
with other political risk variables.
To further examine  possible  multicollinearities,  and capture the  dimensions  of the data,
principal  components  analysis was used.  The objective of principal components  analysis
is  to find  the unit-length  linear combinations  of the variables  with  the greatest variance.
Each of the principal components  represents  an independent dimension of variation.  For
the full set of 46 explanatory variables it was  found that  12 components have eigenvalues
greater  than  one,  accounting  for  71.49%  of the total  variability  in the  data.  Table  4A
reports  the  variables  with component  loadings greater than 0.20  in magnitude.  With  46
variables,  interpretation  of the  components  is  not a simple  matter.  We  see  that the  first
component  is essentially  a measure  of debt,  which  shows that debt and  financial  ratios
separate  the  countries  most.  The  second  component  is  a  political  one  while  the  third
13 If we consider the variables as determinants of the probability  of default,  rather than of observed default
per se, this can explain why the correlations  are lower than one might otherwise  expect.
15measures an external  dimension. Interpretation  of some of the other components  is more
difficult,  although  component  9, representing  a  depreciation-inflation-money  growth
component  shows that  some intuitive dimensions  do still arise  in the  lower components.
The  bivariate  relationships  uncovered  in  the  correlation  analysis  carry  through  to the
multi-dimensional  setting, and it appears that grouping the variables may again provide a
suitable  way  to  summarize  the  data.  Table  4B  reports  the  results  from  principal
components  analysis  carried  out  for  the  grouped  variables.1 4 For  the  most  part  the
components  which  arise  are  easy  to interpret  and  make  economic  sense.  We  see three
dimensions  to  the  Debt  and  Financial  Ratios  - the  total  debt  burden,  a  dimension
measuring the type of creditor, which considers the share of official and multilateral debt
in total debt, and a debt servicing component consisting of arrears and debt due. Resource
Availability  consists  of  a  trade  dimension,  as  measured  by  Exports/GDP  and
Imports/GDP,  and  a  financial  resources  dimension,  which  depends  on  savings  and
reserves. The Economic Conditions and Structural Factors group has a growth dimension,
as measured  by export  and GNP per capita growth,  and a dimension  in per  capita GNP
and terms of trade changes. For the Economic Policy Indicators,  the first component  is a
government  budgetary  dimension,  while  the  second  component  is  an  inflationary
dimension.  The Political Risk Factors have three dimensions with roughly equal weights
on three or four components,  making interpretation  of these components  more difficult.
Finally  we  see  that  there  is  one  dimension  for  rescheduling  history  and  one  for  the
external environment.
This analysis provides important guidelines  for variable choice in the analysis, as to avoid
multicollinearity  problems  one  would  generally  wish  to  not  include  more  than  one
variable  from  each  component  in  the  model.  Furthermore,  for variables  which  do not
appear in the final model chosen, this analysis lets us see the extent to which the effect of
these variables  is captured by other variables included.
5.  An Econometric  Model of Sovereign  Default
The  dependent  variable,  Yit  is  a  binary  choice  variable  which  takes  the  value  one  if
country i defaults  on its debt in year t, and 0 otherwise.  We use panel data binary  choice
techniques to model this default.  Following Hajivassiliou  (1989)  one can view the latent
variable Yit  as representing  country i's underlying creditworthiness,  which depends upon
observable  economic  and political  characteristics  and world  conditions,  measured  by  a
vector xit-1,  an unobserved individual country effect, denoted ai, and an error term  u,t. We
consider only  lagged values  of the explanatory  variables  in order  to reflect the assumed
direction  of  causation,  and  hence  mitigate  simultaneity  effects.  Furthermore,  from  a
practical perspective,  the use  of lagged data  allows for delays in obtaining the  variables
needed,  and hence  is  more  use for  ex-ante  creditworthiness  assessments.  We therefore
have:
Y,t*=xit  l',P+ai+uit  (I)
14 Factor loadings greater than 0.4 are reported, except for the Political Risk variables, where loadings
greater than 0.3 are reported.
16Then when  this  creditworthiness,  or more  precisely  propensity  to  default,  exceeds  the
normalized threshold value of 0, we observe that the country defaults. Thus we have that:
Yit=1  if Yit>0 and Yit=0 otherwise,  (2)
Then  by  making  specific  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of the  error term,  uit  in
equation  (1),  we  can  calculate  the probability  of a default  occurring.  The  use of panel
data allows us to control for unobserved individual  country characteristics,  denoted by ai,
which  reflect persistent  heterogeneity  amongst  nations.  This  may result  from  differing
country  characteristics  such  as  colonial  histories  and  political,  financial  and  religious
institutions.  (Hajivassiliou,  1989).  The  existence  of  such  unobserved  permanent
components  allows  countries  which  are  homogeneous  in  terms  of  their  observed
characteristics  to be heterogeneous  in response  probabilities,  and failure  to account  for
these  effects  can result in biased  and  inconsistent  estimates.  A  standard  issue  in panel
data econometrics  is then whether to treat these effects as fixed or random; we discuss the
relative merits of the two approaches.
5.1.  The Fixed Effects Logit Model
In the fixed  effects  model,  the country-specific  effects  are assumed  to be fixed,  and are
thus additional parameters  in the model.  Chamberlain (1980)  shows that maximization  of
T
the  conditional  likelihood  function,  whereby  one  conditions  on  yi,,  a  minimum
sufficient  statistic  for  as,  yields  a  consistent  estimator  of ,B in  the  panel  logit  model.
However,  a  major  drawback  of  fixed  effect  estimation  for  our  analysis  is  that  only
countries  for  which  Yit  switches  contribute  identifying  information  to  the  likelihood
function,  hence  estimation excludes  all information  from countries which did not default
at least once during the sample period.  Given the sample number of defaulting countries,
this has rather severe consequences  for sample size.
5.2.  The Random Effects  Model
An  alternative  approach  is  to  assume  that the  incidental  parameters,  ai  are  a  random
sampling  from  a N(O,a0 ,2)  distribution.  One  can  then  obtain  consistent  random  effects
maximum-likelihood  estimates  from  both  the  logit  and  probit  specifications  of the
model.15 This  utilizes  information  from  all  the  countries  in  the  sample,  and  hence  is
preferable  to fixed effects analysis for the given data set.
5.3.  State Dependence
Heckman  makes  a  distinction  between  structural  and  spurious  state  dependence.  He
defines  structural state dependence as  indicating  that  "past  experience  has  a  genuine
behavioural  effect  in  the  sense  that  an  otherwise  identical  individual  who  didn't
15 Estimation  was carried out via the xtlogit and xtprobit  commands  in STATA,  which employ a  12-point
Gauss-Henrrite quadrature evaluation procedure.
17experience  the  event  would  behave  differently  in  the  future  than  an  individual  who
experienced  the event".  [Heckman,  1981,  p91]  In the context of sovereign default to the
IBRD,  structural  state  dependence  would  occur  if a  country  which  had  previously
defaulted  would default  again  when  faced  with  the  exact  same economic  and political
conditions  under  which  a country  that had not previously  defaulted  would not default.
This  might be  the  case  if the  experience  of having  defaulted  once  changes  the  way  a
country  views  subsequent  default  to  the  IBRD,  perhaps  as  previous  default  has  a
permanent  influence  on  creditworthiness  reputation.  In  contrast  spurious  state
dependence  occurs  when  "individuals  differ  in  certain  unmeasured  variables  that
influence  their probability  of experiencing  the event,  but that are not influenced  by the
experience  of the event.  If these variables  are correlated over time, and are not properly
controlled,  previous  experience  may  appear  to be  a  determinant  of future  experience
solely because  it is a proxy for such temporally persistent unobservables".  [p91-92] The
omission  of  political  considerations  in  many  previous  studies  would  be  one  such
occurrence.
These  considerations  mean  that  it  is  important  to test  for  true  versus  spurious  state
dependence  in  order to  determine  whether  a  dynamic  model  is  appropriate.  Testing  is
complicated by the possible presence of heterogeneity,  represented by the oi terms. Even
if there is no state dependence,  as long as there are individual effects  in the model it will
be  the  case  that  Pr(yitJxit,yitq)￿Pr(yitIxit).  Baltagi  (1996)  suggests  that one  first run the
pooled logit model,  and test whether y=O  in the model Pr(y1t=l  Ixit, yit.J)  = F(xit'P+yyit.),
where  F(.)  is  the  cdf of  a logistic  distribution.  If the  null  hypothesis  that  y=O  is  not
rejected, then we can proceed with the pooled logit model and ignore the panel nature of
the data. Rejection of the null may occur due to serial correlation in the error term arising
from  individual  effects, or from state dependence.  Hsiao  (1982)  then outlines  a  simple
test for state dependence,  due to Chamberlain,  which is based on whether or not there is a
dynamic  response  to  an intervention.  After conditioning  on the  individual  effects,  as's,
one  includes  lagged  x's without  lagged  y's in the  model,  and tests the  null of no  state
dependence  by  testing  whether:  Pr(yij=lJxit,  xit .,...,ai)=Pr(yit=llxit,cxi).  Rejection  of the
null  indicates  that there  is  state dependence,  and hence  the need to  include  lags of the
dependent variable in the model.
The  distinction  between  spurious  and  true  state  dependence  is  not just  a  question  of
econometric niceties. In their literature survey Aylward  and Thorne  (1998, p14) find that
"past repayment history has  been found to be significant  in every study in which it has
been tested". It is important to test, therefore, whether this merely reflects the omission of
important variables from all  such studies,  or whether  countries default behaviour does in
fact change once it enters nonaccrual  status.
5.4.  Measures of Fit
Several  measures  are  often  used  in  the  literature  to  evaluate  the  fit  of binary  choice
models. One measure often reported is the pseudo-R2, given by the formula:
18pseudo-R  =  1-  where  L(,B)  is the log-likelihood  evaluated at the MLE estimate
,/  and  /  is the MLE in the constant only model.  The pseudo-R2 has the properties that:
pseudo-R2 E  [0,1],  the larger the contribution of the bona fide variables  to the maximum
of the likelihood  function,  the  closer is  pseudo-R2 to unity,  and it stands  in one-to-one
relation with the chi-squared  statistic for testing the hypothesis that the coefficients on all
variables apart  from the constant  are jointly zero.[Dhrymes,  1986]  Another  measure  of
statistical peformance is the Chi-squared statistic for overall significance, which tests the
joint significance  of all variables in our model.  For all models reported in this paper this
test rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance.
The best indicator of the models  performance  is its degree of success  in predicting  the
occurrence and  absence of default.  The estimation  process yields predicted probabilities
for  each  country.  To  translate  these  into  predictions  about  default  it  is  necessary  to
choose a threshold probability P* above which a country is predicted to default and below
which no default takes place.  Type I error occurs when for a particular country  a year is
incorrectly classified as a nondefault case, whereas in fact default did take place. Type II
errors are those errors where a nondefault  case  is incorrectly classified as a default case.
Cline (1984)  suggests that the critical threshold should be chosen so as to minimize total
error subject to a relatively equal percentage  rate of error across the two types.  He finds
that a threshold level of 0.041 to best achieve this balance, and attributes the low level to
the  large  imbalance  between  nonrescheduling  and  rescheduling  cases  in  his  sample'6.
This high  propensity  of nonevent  cases  also  characterizes  our  sample,  and  we  hence
expect that similarly  low threshold probabilities  will be needed.  We use  a threshold  of
0.05  for the majority  of our study, but report the results  from using other  levels  where
appropriate.  As a practical matter,  countries with predicted values  slightly less  than this
threshold  can be considered  as belonging  to a "watch  group"  of at-risk  countries,  and
such countries should be examined more closely.
5.4.1.  Interpretation of the Threshold
In our  sample  of 675  observations  we have  41  defaults  to the  IBRD. Thus  the  sample
mean probability  of default  is 41/675  =  0.06.  A 95%  confidence  interval  for the  mean
probability of default is (0.04,  0.08). Thus if the estimated probability of default is above
0.08,  we are  95%  confident  that the  country  is more  likely  to  default  than  a country
chosen at random in the  sample. Reflecting  our concem with Type I over Type II  errors
we choose  0.05 as the threshold cutoff point,  which enables us to detect relatively more
defaults.
16 Cline's sample contained 97 percent nonrescheduling  cases and 3 percent rescheduling  cases.
196.  Econometric Results
6.1.  Results for IBRD Estimation
6.1.1.  The Panel Logit Model of Default
Table 5 presents  the panel  logit estimation  results for default on IBRD  loans.  We first
present  the  saturated  model,  which  contains  at  least  one  element  from  each  of the
principal  components  found,  and covers the main variables  found in the literature.  Only
58  countries had data available  for the full  set of variables  considered.  We  see that the
lagged default term is the most significant  explanatory variable,  and we thus reject the
joint null of no state dependence and no heterogeneity.  The estimated coefficients  for the
pooled  logit and  random effects  logit are  equal  for the  saturated model,  a result  of the
extreme overfitting here.  The second and third columns of Table 5 give the estimates,  for
the pooled logit and random effects logit respectively, for the preferred sub-model of this
saturated model.  A likelihood ratio  test does not  reject  the  submodel  in  favour of the
saturated model. We  consider only the Government  Deficit/GDP percentage  in our final
model as a Chi-squared  test of the null hypothesis  that the  Government  Revenue/GDP
and Government Expenditure/GDP  percentages  have  equal and opposite  effects on the
propensity to default could not be rejected  In this submodel we see that the proportion of
the total variance contributed by the panel-level  variance,  denoted  p, is 0.10,  and a chi-
squared test does not reject that p=0.  Thus  the random effects  and pooled estimators  do
not differ greatly, and efficiency concems therefore dictate that one should use the pooled
logit  estimator.  Thus  any  country  heterogeneity  is  captured  by the  lagged  dependent
variable and the other explanatory variables.
Chamberlain's  test for state  dependence  was carried  out  for both the saturated and the
submodel, using random effects estimators to condition on any individual country effects.
In both cases we  overwhelmingly  reject the null of no state dependence,  and hence need
to include the lagged dependent variable in our model. The interpretation of this is that a
country which has defaulted in the previous period exhibits different default behaviour to
one that hasn't, ceteris  paribus. This reflects not just the fact that a country in default will
have built up IBRD arrears,  which it must pay back to exit default, but also that once a
country  enters  default,  it suffers  the  reputational  and creditworthiness  consequences  of
this  action,  with  a  further  year  in  default  having  a  much  smaller  impact  on
creditworthiness  perceptions than does entering into default.
The  submodel shows  that default to the IBRD can be  modeled parsimoniously  through
six explanatory variables, all of which are significant at the 90% level.  A country is more
likely to default on  its IBRD debt if it defaulted in  the previous period, if it has a  large
private arrears to total debt ratio, and if it has been paying only a  small proportion of its
total debt service  due in the preceding  period. These  latter two  debt ratios  show that a
country's debt-servicing  performance  with other creditors  impacts on its ability  to meet
IBRD obligations.  A large budget deficit relative  to GDP makes a country more liable to
default  to  the  IBRD,  reflecting  the  effects  of  a  sovereign's  demand  for  borrowing.
Politics matters, especially the extent of military involvement in the politics of a country.
20Unsurprisingly  a country  is more likely  to default  involving  a  coup  d'6tat.' 7 The  final
factor to  have  an  effect  is  the  G7  Current  Account  Balance/GDP  ratio,  reflecting  the
importance  of  the  global  environment  on  sovereign  default.  Theoretically  this  ratio
represents both the demand by G7 countries  for other nations'  exports  and also the supply
of funds  available  from  G7  countries.  We  find  a  greater  G7  current  account  surplus
relative  to  GDP  to reduce  the  probability  of default.  This  indicates  that  the  liquidity
effect,  whereby more global funds are available  for borrowing, dominates  any effect from
a reduction in exports on the propensity to default. In the data we see this through a close
association  between  the  real  LIBOR  rate  and  the G7  Current  Account/GDP  ratio18  -
omitting the  G7  CA/GDP  ratio results in  a  significant  positive  coefficient  on  the  real
LIBOR rate.  The small trade  effect also reflects the fact that the  majority of G7 imports
originate from developed  countries,  so that the effect of changes in the Current Account
surplus on developing country exports may be of second order.
In the final column  of Table  5 we report  standardized coefficients from  the pooled  logit
submodel.  In a logit model,  the effect of a unit change in one of the  regressors depends
on the  levels  of all the regressors,  so we standardize  the  coefficients  by evaluating  the
partial derivative  at the mean probability  level  in  the  sample.  That  is  the standardized
coefficients  are  = p(1 -p),8.  The mean probability  level in  our sample  is 0.0607,
&xk
which  is very  close  to our cutoff threshold of 0.05.  Thus  the standardized  coefficients
reflect the effect of a change in the regressor  for a country which  is a border-line  default
case  on the  estimated  default  probability.  Thus,  for example,  an increase  in  the  budget
deficit by an extra  1% of GDP increases the probability of default by 0.0046 at the mean.
The range of the various regressors  varies, but for each variable a change in one standard
deviation of the  variable has an  impact on the  default probability  of approximately 0.05
in magnitude.
We  report  the  within  sample  fit  for  a  range  of cutoff  probabilities,  and  see  that  in
accordance  with  the  findings  of Cline(1984),  a  low  threshold  probability  is  to  be
preferred  in  order  to  balance  Type  I  and  Type  II  errors.  Over  a  range  of models,  a
threshold of 0.05  seemed  reasonably robust,  and we suggest this be used, with countries
with probabilities  in the  0.03-0.05 range  examined  on a case-by-case  basis.  We  see that
with a  0.05  threshold,  the  Type I  error is 4.88%  and the  Type  II  error is  8.68%,  which
indicates  a  good within  sample  fit.  We  then reestimated  the model  using  only  defaults
which occurred prior to 1994, using this model to examine the out-of-sample  fit over the
period  1994-98.  9  The results are reported at the bottom of Table 5 and indicate the model
performs well over this period.
17 Stronger overall  politics, as measured  by the  total political  index,  lessens the likelihood  of default,  but
once the military variable was included the overall effect was insignificant.
18 The correlation between  the G7 current account balance/GDP and the real LIBOR rate was -0.551.
19 Of course  this is not a true test of out-of-sample  fit as we have already used the data from  1994-98  in our
model  selection process.  However  the  scarcity of defaults precludes  withholding  these observations  from
all  stages  of the estimation  process,  and  the  analysis  carried  out  here at  least indicates that the  model  is
stable over this period.
216.1.2.  Model  Robustness
None of the other variables listed in Table  2  had a significant coefficient  when added to
the model above, nor were further lags of the dependent variable found to be significant.
Of the financial ratios,  the total debt service paid/total  debt service  due variable  was the
only significant variable.  Debt service  due to exports or GNP ratios were not significant.
To test whether some of the structural factors,  such as GNP per capita  and growth  rates
were  having  an  effect  over  a  longer  time  frame,  lags  of one  to  five  years  of these
variables  were  tried,  and  all  resulted  insignificant.  The  number  of other  countries  in
default in a given year, as an indicator of contagion, was also insignificant. Likewise the
number of countries  in default to the Paris Club  in the previous  year was  insignificant.
We tested for an  interaction  between  the political score  and the share  of multilateral or
IBRD debt of total debt and could not reject  the null hypothesis of no interaction.  This
suggests  that  politics  has  a  direct  effect  on  default,  rather  than  merely  through  its
influence  on the  sources  of financing  a country  can obtain.  Throughout  the  addition  of
these  variables,  the  coefficients  of  the  model  in  Table  5  maintained  their  sign,
significance,  and generally their magnitude,  indicating the model to be robust to alternate
specifications.
6.1.3.  Modeling without the lagged dependent variable:
In light of the small number of economic  variables found in the preferred model  fitted, it
is of interest to examine if this is a result of the lagged dependent variable  capturing all
the pertinent information in these variables.  To investigate this further,  Table 6 shows the
results  of fitting  a model  without  the  lagged  dependent variable.  We  see many  of the
variables are the same as in the preferred submodel  in Table  5. Additionally  we now find
the total IBRD Debt stock/Exports  to have a positive impact on the likelihood of default,
total political risk rather than the involvement of military to be more important, a positive
impact from the real LIBOR rate,  and from  the OECD  Business  Cycle.  We see that as
expected,  the  fit of this model  is not as good  as for the  model which conditions  on the
lagged  dependent  variable,  with  the  model  giving  large  Type  I  errors.  Again  the
Chamberlain test for state dependence  strongly rejects  the null of no  state dependence,
invalidating  this model.
6.1.4.  Fixed Effects Model
As noted, the use of fixed effects means that all observations  on countries  which do not
change their default status  at least once during the sample period are dropped.  The result
is  that the  model  is  estimated  for only  the  14 defaulting  countries  for which  we have
sufficient data.  The variables included in the model were  the lagged dependent variable,
share of total debt service due which is paid, the share of short-term debt in total debt, the
ratio of total  IBRD debt stock to exports  and the  OECD Business  Cycle.  The fit of the
fixed  effects  model was much  poorer than that of the random  effects model,  with large
Type  I errors  in particular,  and  hence  suggest  that the  random  effects  models,  which
utilize all of the data, are preferable.
226.1.5.  Treatment of IDA  Reverse Graduates & Fifth Dimension  Recipients
One  of the criteria  used  to  determine  a  country's  eligibility  for  IDA funds  is  lack  of
creditworthiness  for IBRD  funds.  Thus  the  question  arises  as  to  how  one  should treat
IDA-eligible  nations  with  outstanding  IBRD  loans,  since  these  countries  are  by  one
measure  already deemed IBRD uncreditworthy.  The approach used above is to treat them
in the same way as other IBRD borrowers,  since we  are still interested  in the likelihood
that these countries  default.  However, with countries  which "reverse  graduate",  whereby
they become reeligible for IDA credits  due to a drop  in per capita GNP and other events,
it may be argued that if it were not for their access to IDA funding, these countries would
default  on their  IBRD  loans.  If so,  we  may  consider  reverse  graduates  as  additional
defaults for the purposes of modeling. Table 7 reports the results from combining reverse
graduates  with  IBRD  defaulters.  The  problem  is  that  there  are  then  more  reverse
graduate  country-year  observations  than  actual  defaults,  and the  model  becomes  more
one of modeling  reverse  graduates.  Thus  we  find  unsurprisingly  GNP  per  capita  and
export growth  to be important, whereby  for modeling defaults alone they were not. Thus
this  approach  does not  appear to  be a fruitful  one,  although  it does  indicate  that IIBRD
defaulters and Reverse Graduates do not form a homogeneous pool.
Another  aspect  of this  is  the  use  of so  called  Fifth Dimension  Funds,  whereby  IDA
reflows  are  used  to  cover  the  IBRD  debt  service  interest  payments  for  IDA-only
countries.  Under  the  Fifth  Dimension,  IDA  supplied  about  $1.0  billion  for  SPA20
countries  to pay off IBRD debt,  with donors  contributing  another $0.2 billion.  Many of
these  recipients  were  IDA countries  that received  enclave  loans,  which  are now  being
amortized,  so  the  role  of  Fifth  Dimension  funding  may  diminish  in  the  future.
Nevertheless,  historically  it may have been  important  in  preventing  IBRD  default,  and
there may be  lessons  from this experience  which can be applied  to other forms of debt
relief.  Thus there  is a  case  to  be made  for considering  carefully  these countries  also  as
defaulters.  This has not been done  in the present study  due to time delays in  obtaining
historical records  of Fifth Dimension  recipients,  but may  provide  an  avenue  for future
refinement of this model.
6.1.6.  Modeling  IBRD Default 5-years  in advance.
The analysis  in this paper attempts  to  ascertain  the determinants  of default  one year  in
advance.  With  good  forecasts  of the  regressors  one  can  use  the  resulting  models  to
determine default several  years in advance,  but the political variables,  in particular,  may
be  difficult to  forecast,  and  macro  forecasting  beyond  two  to three  years  can  be  very
inaccurate. Nonetheless,  the relatively long maturity of IBRD loans makes it necessary to
determine future creditworthiness  beyond a one or two year horizon.  In Table 8  we report
random  effects panel logit estimates used in modeling  default to the IBRD as a function
of variables  lagged five years. We use the annual average growth in per capita GNP over
20  Special  Program  of Assistance  (SPA)  was  launched  in  1987  as  a  donor-coordinated  response  to  the
Africa continentwide  debt  and development  crisis.  The Eligibility criteria  for SPA  are  1)  low-income,  in
terms  of IDA  eligibility,  2)debt  distress,  in  terms of  a  debt  service  ratio  of 30%  or  more,  and  3)  an
adjustment  program  supported  by  the  IMF  and  IDA.  See  the  SPA  website  at
http:/lafr.worldbank.org/aftkl/spal.htm  for more information on the SPA.
23the past five-year period to reflect the fact that GNP growth is  one of the most common
forecasts,  so one  could use forecasts  of average  growth  over a five-year period, and the
idea that it is cumulative  growth over a medium term period which is important.  Business
cycles  may  differ  across  countries  both  in  terms  of amplitude  and  period,  so using
smoothed  growth  rates  rather than  one-year  rates  may  be preferable  for medium  termn
analysis.  We note firstly that a random-effects model is needed, with panel level variation
much  more  important  in  the  five  year  model  than  when  we  use  one-year  lags.  This
reflects the fact that country heterogeneity,  or country-specific  shocks, have an important
impact  on default probabilities  when  one looks  five years into the  future.  According  to
the model, a country is more likely to default in five years time if it has a low savings to
GNP  ratio,  a  large  budget  deficit,  high  total  political  risk,  is  currently  paying  a  low
portion of its  debt service  due, and has low  expected average  growth over the next  five
years.  These results easily  accord with our intuition.  In contrast,  we also find that for a
given level of these other variables, a current high level of debt to exports,  and  current
high arrears to private creditors makes a country less likely to default to the IBRD in five-
years  time.  This  may  reflect  the  influence  of  IMF  stabilization  programs  in  place
following default  to other  creditors.  Given  these variables,  the  default status  at time  t-5
was  not  a  significant  determinant  of default  at  time  t. When  we  examine  the  within
sample fit of the model, we see that we need an extremely low cutoff threshold, of 10-7, to
achieve a roughly equal proportion of Type I and Type II errors, which are still 28% and
23%  respectively.  In common with other models in this paper, many of the Type  I errors
were for one particular country in which it is often thought default was more a matter of
unwillingness to pay.
The results, therefore,  show that it is difficult to predict default five years into the future.
Economic and Political conditions may change quite dramatically  over this time, and the
use  of the  explanatory  variables  lagged  five  years  does  not  take  such  changes  into
account. Table 8 shows the correlations between the fifth and first lags of the explanatory
variables,  and while  quite high in  some  cases,  it is  the observations  that change which
may account for a change  in default status. As such one would wish to consider forecasts
in the  model  where  possible,  although  historical  records  of forecasts  may  be hard  to
obtain  for some  variables, making panel data  studies difficult.  Moreover  given the vast
number of different  economic  forecasts  made for the same  variable,  the question  as to
which forecast to use when modeling needs to be addressed. An alternative  approach may
be to use a more structural model, whereby one explicitly models the build-up in debt and
lowering  of reserves  as a function  of structural  factors  such as GNP per  capita  growth
rates, terms  of trade movements,  the inflation  rate and other such variables.  One would
then have default depending  on this  latter group of factors  through  their impact on our
debt and financial ratios.
6.2.  Results for Paris Club Default Estimation
Table 9 reports the results of using panel logit analysis to model the likelihood of default
to Paris Club creditors.  We note firstly that there is a much higher incidence of default to
the  Paris Club  than to  the IBRD,  as was  shown  in Figure  3. Of the  673  country-year
observations  in the saturated model, there are only 40 IBRD defaults, as compared to 260
Paris Club default  observations.  We run exactly the  same saturated  model as we did for
IBRD defaults, but using defaults to the Paris Club as the dependent variable.  The pooled
24and random effects logit estimates are once again identical to each other, but we see more
variables  show up  as significant in this saturated model than in the IBRD case. A test of
p=O did not reject the null in the submodels either, and we  hence report only the pooled
logit estimates for the submodels.  It appears that any heterogeneity  amongst countries  is
controlled for by the explanatory variables used in these models.
In  the  third  column  of Table  9  we  report  our preferred  model  for Paris  Club  default,
which was  exhaustively  tested against alternatives  following the steps used in modeling
default to the  IBRD.  The  resultant  model  includes  several  of the  variables  most  often
found to  be  significant  in the  literature.  We  find  that the  higher a country's  short-term
debt as  a  percentage  of total debt,  the higher  its total debt stock  relative  to exports,  the
greater its  arrears to private  creditors,  and  the  lower its reserves  relative  to imports  the
more  likely  the  country  is  to  be  in  default  to  Paris  Club  creditors.  These  financial
variables  show that it is not just total debt, but also its composition which is important to
creditworthiness.  The  strongest  effect is  once  again  the rescheduling  history,  reflecting
state dependence  once  again.  More  exports  relative to GDP  and less  imports relative  to
GDP  have  a weak  effect  on  reducing  the  likelihood  of default.  We  find two  external
variables  to  have  highly  significant  effects  on  the  likelihood  of default  to Paris  Club
creditors.  In  common  with  the  IBRD  default  model,  a  G7  current  account  surplus,
reflecting increased  liquidity, lessens the  chance of any country defaulting.  Secondly, we
also find that an increase  in the real LIBOR rate raises  the likelihood of default to Paris
Club  creditors.  This effect is closely related to the current  account effect,  although both
variables  show up as significant in the model.  On the political  front,  we once again find
that greater involvement of the military in politics raises the likelihood of default, but this
effect  is  offset  to  a  degree  by  the  total  political  score.  For  a  given  level  of military
involvement, a reduction in total political risk actually increases the likelihood of default.
This somewhat  counterintuitive result reflects the fact that we measure Paris Club default
by  means  of  rescheduling  agreements,  which  require  both  an  IMF  program  and
negotiations with multiple creditors. An unstable political system may prevent these  from
occurring, reducing  the probability of a default  being  measured. This  suggests  that one
may wish to supplement Paris Club rescheduling  data with arrears  data to obtain a more
inclusive definition of Paris Club defaults.
The higher incidence of default indicates that we  should use a higher cutoff threshold for
determining predicted default, and we suggest 0.30 to be an appropriate  level. Again this
is set at a level slightly below the sample mean  incidence of defaults,  reflecting a greater
concern  with Type I errors.  The within sample type I and type II error rates are both low,
at 5.4% and 6.5% respectively,  suggesting this model provides  a good fit in determining
creditworthiness  to Paris Club creditors.
6.3.  Results for Commercial Bank Default Estimation:
Following our estimation of the determinants  of default to Paris Club  creditors,  we now
turn  our  attention  to  Commercial  Bank  lending.  Once  again  we  do  not  reject  the
hypothesis  of no random  effects,  and hence  Table  10  reports  the pooled logit estimates
used to model  default to  this group of creditors.  We see that in  common with the  Paris
Club default  models, the saturated model has  a lot more  significant variables than in the
25case  of IBRD  default.  In column  2 we report the  estimates  for the preferred  model for
modeling the likelihood of default to Commercial Banks.  We see that financial,  political
and external  variables all have strong  effects on the propensity  to default to Commercial
Banks.  The financial  variables  all  take  the  expected  signs:  a country  with high  private
arrears  relative  to total  debt,  high short-term  debt and  a low proportion  of private debt
service  due being paid is more likely  to default.  Again the lagged  dependent  variable is
the most significant term.  We see several dimensions  of political risk have an impact on
defaults  to Commercial  Banks - a lower investment profile  score, a greater involvement
of the  military  in politics,  and poor  law  and  order  all make  a  country  more  likely  to
default  to Commercial  Banks.  This interpretation  is complicated by the positive  sign on
the  total  political  risk  index,  which  serves  to  reduce  the  joint  effect  of these  three
components.  The  overall political  effect  is  still  that greater  political  risk  increases  the
likelihood of default.  In common with the  IBRD and Paris Club models the G7 Current
account surplus relative to GDP has a negative impact on the propensity to default. Again
using a 0.30 cutoff threshold  for determining default, we see that this model is the best fit
of the three creditor groups, with Type I errors of only 3.2% and Type II errors of 6.2%.
6.4.  Comparison of Models
6.4.1.  Using Paris Club and Commercial  Bank models to model IBRD
default:
In Table  11  we compare the preferred IBRD default  model to the results from using the
preferred  models  for Paris Club  and  Commercial  Bank default  to model IBRD default.
We  see that scarcely any of the variables which  were significant when used in modeling
default  to  the  other  creditors  show  up  as  significant  when  we  turn  our  attention  to
modeling  default  to  the IBRD.  The  predicted default probabilities  are highly correlated
with those from the preferred IBRD model, but in terms of Type I and Type II errors the
models for the other two creditor groups do worse.
We see therefore  that different models are needed to model  default to the three types of
creditors, but that all three models contain financial, political,  and external  variables.  All
three models  contain the  lagged dependent  variable,  indicating  that state dependence  is
important,  arrears  to  private  creditors,  the  extent  of military  in  politics,  and  the  G7
Current Account/GDP  ratio.  All three models also contain one further debt ratio variable,
although  the  actual  variable  differs  across  models.  It is noticeable  that the  government
budget deficit/GDP  ratio  is  important  for modeling  default  to the IBRD, but not to the
other  creditors.  This  may  reflect  the  increased  reluctance  of nations  to  default  to the
IBRD, compared  to the  other creditor groups,  so that a government will use its resources
to meet IBRD payments if at all possible.  In our sample  only three default observations
had budget  surpluses  in the  year  prior  to  default,  with  only  a  sole  case  of a country
entering into default with a budget surplus.
These results  therefore indicate  that some of the same underlying factors  are influencing
sovereign  default  in  each  case,  but  the  variables  through  which  these  underlying
influences best manifest themselves  differ to some  degree across creditors.  This suggests
that one may wish to try using the principal components  found, instead of the individual
26ratios,  in  order to  attain  a common  set of factors  explaining  all  three classes of default.
However,  the  downside  of  this  is  that  interpretation  becomes  less  clear,  and  as
transparency  is an important consideration in determining risk ratings, this approach may
not be  suitable.  The familiarity  of ratios  such as debt service  to  exports,  or reserves  to
imports, means that a model based on such factors is more easily understood by its users.
6.5.  Modeling IBRD Default as a Two-Step Process
The  above  analysis  models  default  to  each  creditor  group  separately.  However,  the
preferred model for IBRD default  contains the extent of arrears to private  creditors,  and
the repayment performance  to all creditors as explanatory variables,  demonstrating a link
between  default  to other  creditors  and default to  the  IBRD.  In this  section we  examine
this  link more  closely,  to  ascertain  whether  there  is  evidence  for  a creditor  hierarchy,
whereby countries first default to Commercial  Banks and Paris  Club creditors,  and then
subsequently  default  to the IBRD.  One  would like to then determine  which factors  are
most important in driving countries  to take the additional step of defaulting to the IBRD.
We  consider  two  different  approaches  to  examine  this  hypothesis.  Firstly  we  use the
predicted  probability  of  default  to  Commercial  Banks2'  in  year  t  as  an  explanatory
variable in  the panel  logit analysis of IBRD  default  in year t.  The  resulting model then
shows the additional  factors in year t-l which impact on the probability of default to the
IBRD.  Models  Al  and  A2  in  Table  12  report  the  results  of this  analysis.  We  find  a
random  effects  logit model  is  necessary  to account  for country  heterogeneity,  and that
once  again  state  dependence  is  important,  resulting  in  the  inclusion  of  the  lagged
dependent variable  in Model  Al.  As  one would expect, the likelihood  of default to the
IBRD is strongly positively related to the estimated probability of default to Commercial
Banks.  Additionally  a  lower share of official  debt service  due being paid  increases  the
probability  of default,  representing  the  effect  of official  creditor  default  in  addition  to
Commercial  Bank  default.  The  only  other factors  to have  a significant  impact are both
political  variables,  showing that  external conflict  and a high involvement  of military in
government  have  greater  effects  on  IBRD  default.  In  Model  A2  we  omit the  lagged
dependent variable,  and find that countries in which IBRD debt forms  a larger  share of
the total debt, and countries with more short-term debt, are more likely to default.
The  second  approach  we use  to  examine  the plausibility  of a  default  hierarchy  is  to
restrict our sample to  consider only countries which are in  default to either Commercial
Banks and/or Paris Club creditors in year t-l in modeling default to the IBRD in year t. In
model  B 1 we  see that nations with a high share  of IBRD  debt in total debt,  high short
term  debt,  a  low  share  of official  debt  service  due  being  paid  and  high  government
consumption  relative  to  GDP  are  more  likely  to  default  to  the  IBRD  having  already
defaulted  to  other  creditors.  Once  again  there  is  state  dependence,  so  the  lagged
dependent variable matters, and politics matters. Countries with poor law and order and a
large  involvement  of military in politics  are more  likely to default to the IBRD.  If we
omit the lagged dependent variable  we see that a higher total arrears  to total debt ratio is
21 The correlation of 0.64 between the predicted probabilities of default to Commercial Banks and to Paris
club creditors meant that both predicted probabilities  could not be used as significant regressors in the logit
analysis. We used predicted  defaults to Commercial Banks as this gave a closer fit.
27additionally important.  We report  type I  and type  II errors for both a 0.05  cutoff, and  a
0.10 cutoff, the latter being preferred in this case as it is approximately  the sample mean
default propensity.
A  cursory  examination  of the  IBRD  default  history  shows  that  countries  typically22
default  to  other  creditors  before  defaulting  to  the  IBRD;  this  analysis  enables  us  to
understand more clearly  why certain countries  do not continue into default  to the IBRD,
whereas  others  do.  Together  with  the  results  of the  previous  section,  these  results
therefore do provide  evidence of a graduated hierarchy  of default, whereby nations  first
default to other  creditor  groups,  and then only  default to the IBRD under more  severe
circumstances.  A country with a high share of short-term debt and IBRD debt will clearly
find  it harder  to make  its  IBRD  payments,  and  together  with  unfavourable  political
circumstances,  such as a heavy military presence and external conflict,  this will increase
the chances of subsequent default to the IBRD.
7.  Conclusions
The  small  number  of  cases  of IBRD  nonaccrual  and  their  seemingly  idiosyncratic,
political  nature  have  led several  observers  to conclude  that  one can  simply  not  model
IBRD default.  This  study provides  some ammunition  against this viewpoint,  and shows
that while modeling can be difficult,  it is possible to identify key economic, political and
external variables  which impact on the likelihood that a country will default to the IBRD.
The results provide  evidence of a graduated hierarchy  of defaults, whereby  countries in
trouble  first  default  to  Paris  Club  and/or  Commercial  Bank  creditors,  and  only  then
default to the IBRD if circumstances  are particularly unfavourable.  Default to the IBRD
is thus a distinct, but related, phenomenon to default to other creditor groups.
The relatively  larger number of defaults  to Paris Club  and Commercial  Bank creditors
enables  one to discern  the effects  of more  variables than  is possible with IBRD  default,
and  to  obtain  more  accurate  within  sample  fits.  For  both  creditor  groups  the  within
sample Type I and Type II error percentages were in the order of 5-6%,  which compares
favourably  with  much  of the  literature  in  this  area.  The  resulting  models  of default
contain  many of the  standard  ratios  considered  in country-risk  analysis,  such  as  Total
Debt/Exports, Reserves/Imports,  Private Arrears/Total  Debt Stock, Short-term Debt/Total
Debt  Stock,  Exports/GDP  and Imports/GDP.  In  addition,  political  and  external  factors,
including  the investment  profile,  the extent of military involvement  in politics,  the  real
LIBOR rate and the G7 Current Account  Deficit/GDP, also impact on the probability of
default.
We modeled IBRD default both separately,  and through a two-step process  whereby we
first  considered  default  to  other  creditors,  and  examined  the  factors  which  result  in
subsequent  default  to the  IBRD.  In both  cases  we  arrive  at  a  parsimonious  model  of
IBRD default in which  a country is more  likely to default if it has severe problems with
other creditors, as measured by high private arrears and a low debt service paid/due ratio,
22 The only cases of default to the IBRD without "default" to other creditors are for two countries which did
not obtain IMF  Programs,  and thus could not undertake Paris or London Club reschedulings.  Nevertheless
these countries stopped paying their other creditors, and a better definition of default would capture this.
28if  it  is  running  a  large  budget  deficit  relative  to  GDP,  and if it  has  a  high  military
presence  in  government,  reflecting  unfavourable  political  conditions.  The  two-step
process  finds that countries  with a high share  of their debt in the form of short-term  and
IBRD debt are also more likely to default to the IBRD. In common with defaults to other
creditors,  we  find a G7 current  account  surplus  to lower the probability  of default.  This
surplus represents  the  availability  of capital  flows  from  G7  countries,  and  lowers  the
probability  of default by both increasing  the supply of funds available,  and lowering the
real  LIBOR  rate  and hence  costs  of those  funds.  This  demonstrates  that  for an  IBRD
borrower,  the  liquidity  effect  of a  G7  current account  surplus  outweighs  any  effect of
reduced exports to the G7 economies,  at least in terms  of its impact on the likelihood of
default.
A larger budget deficit relative  to GDP increases the  likelihood that a nation will default
to the IBRD, but was not a significant determinant of default to the other creditor groups.
The greater seriousness  of default to the IBRD means that a government will not default
to the IBRD while running a budget surplus, but rather would use those resources to meet
the necessary  repayments.  In contrast, payments  to other creditors may not have  such  a
high priority in the government budget.
State  dependence  was  found  to  be  important  in modeling  default  to  all  three  creditor
groups.  Tests revealed true state dependence, whereby  a country which enters into default
changes  its  behaviour,  so that  it may  continue  to default  when  faced  with  economic,
political  and  external conditions identical  to those under which a country which has not
previously  defaulted will not default. This reflects not just the build-up in arrears which a
country must repay to exit nonaccrual  status, but also the idea that the reputational  costs
of default are mainly incurred when default occurs. The reputational and creditworthiness
consequences  of an  additional  year  of default,  once  default has  already  occurred,  are
likely to be of second  order, and the country may choose to  stay into  default until it can
exit under the most favourable conditions possible for it.
Structural  factors  and the longer-term  economic  outlook do not significantly  impact  on
the likelihood of default one year in advance. We do not find export and GNP per capita
growth  rates,  the  inflation  rate,  or  the  level  of per  capita  GNP  to  be  a  significant
determinant of default in any of our short-term  models. The five-year average growth rate
and the  gross  national  savings  rate are important  once  we model default five years  into
the  future,  however  modeling  default  is  much  less  accurate  over  this  horizon.  The
inherent  unpredictability  of  political  events  over  longer  horizons  compounds  this
problem. Operationally  the Bank can not change  its exposure,  or write loan contracts, for
one-year  intervals,  so  ideally  one  would  wish  to  predict  future  creditworthiness  over
longer horizons.
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30Appendix  1: Principal Sources of Data Used:23
Global Development Finance  1999 CDROM
Total Debt Stocks (EDT).
Total Debt(EDT)/Exports  of goods and services (%)
Total Debt(EDT)/GNP (%)
Interest arrears,  Official creditors
Interest arrears,  Private creditors
Principal arrears, Official creditors
Principal arrears, Private creditors
Short-term Debt/Total debt (EDT) (%)
IBRD Debt Outstanding and Disbursed (DOD).
PPG, Official Creditors - DOD and TDS.
PPG, Private Creditors - DOD and TDS.
Multilateral Debt/Total Debt (EDT) (%)
Debt Service, total long-term
Reserves/Imports  of goods and services (months) - together with data from World Development Indicators
1999 CDROM
Exports of Good and Services
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Gross national savings, including NCTR (% of GNP)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)
GNP per capita (constant  1995 US$)
GNP per capita growth (annual %)
Gross National Product (US$)
GDP growth (annual %)
Terns of Trade adjustment (constant LCU)
Inflation,  consumer prices (annual %) - together with data from IMF International  Financial  Statistics.
Expenditure,  total (% of GDP)
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)
General  government consumption (% of GDP)
World Development Indicators CDROM 1999
Exchange Rate - Local currency units per US$ (annual average).
Money and quasi money (M2)  as % of GDP
For the OECD & G7 Countries:
GNP per capita growth (annual %)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
GNP at market prices  (constant  1995 USS)
IMF International  Financial Statistics
Three month LIBOR: Offer London
Industrial  Inflation
Export Unit Values:  All Developing Countries,  Non-Oil Developing Countries.
World Debt Tables/Global  Development Finance Reports  1984-99
Interest, Principal,  and Total Debt Due data came from the following series:
Contractual Obligations on Outstanding long-term debt:
- Principal and Interest to:  a) Bilateral Creditors
23 Data from principal  sources was supplemented with additional  information from the World Bank LDB,
Unified Survey and from EIU reports.
31b) Multilateral Creditors
c) Commnercial  Banks
d) Other Private Creditors
Prior to 1991  contractual obligations were broken down only into Official and Private Creditors.
Finance Credit Risk (FINCR) Intemal Records
IBRD History of Nonaccrual.
Global Development Finance 1999: Analysis and Summary Tables
Paris Club and Commercial Bank Rescheduling  Agreements from Tables A3.2 and A2.3 respectively.
This source was supplemented by information from The Institute of  International  Finance  Surveys of  Debt
Restructuring  by Commercial  Banks/Official Creditors  and the IMF reports on Official Financingfor
Developing Countries  and Private  Market Financingfor  developing countries.
PRS Intemational  Country Risk Guide (ICRG) - 1984-99
The stated aim of  the PRS political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the
countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. This  is done by assigning risk points to a pre-set group
of political  risk components.  Points  are assigned by the  ICRG editors  on the basis of a series  of pre-set
questions  for  each  component,  to ensure  consistency  between  countries  and  over time.  The  minimum
number of points that can be  assigned to  each  component  is  zero, while the maximum number  of points
depends on the fixed weight that component  is given in the overall political  risk assessment.  In every case
the lower the risk point total, the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point total  the lower the risk. We
use  the  total  political  risk  index,  representing  the  sum  of all  components,  together  with the  individual
components  themselves. Data are reported on a monthly basis, and hence we use the monthly average  over
the year for a given series.
The components  and weights  are as follows:
Component  Weipht
A Government Stability  12
B Socioeconomic  Conditions  12
C Investment Profile  12
D Internal Conflict  12
E External Conflict  12
F Corruption  6
G Military in Politics  6
H Religion  in Politics  6
I Law and Order  6
J Ethnic Tensions  6
K Democratic Accountability  6
L Bureaucracy Quality  4
A brief description of each component is provided  below:24
Government stability - This  is  a  measure  both  of the  government's  ability  to  carry  out  its  declared
program(s),  and its ability to stay in office.
Socioeconomic conditions - This  is  an attempt to  measure  general public  satisfaction,  or dissatisfaction,
with the  govermment's  economic policies.  Socioeconomic  conditions  cover  a  broad  spectrum of factors
ranging  from infant mortality and medical provision to housing and interest rates.  PRS attempts to identify
those factors  that are important for the society  in question,  i.e. those with the greatest political  impact, and
assess the country on that basis.
24  Descriptions are taken from those given by PRS in their June 1999 ICRG.
32Investment profile - This is a measure of the  government's attitude to inward investment as determined by
our assessment of four sub-components:  the risk to operations,  taxation, repatriation and labor costs.
Internal conflict - This  is  an  assessment  of political  violence  in the  country  and  its  actual or  potential
impact on govemance.  The highest rating  is given to those countries where there is no armed opposition to
the  government and  the  government  does not indulge  in arbitrary violence,  direct  or indirect,  against  its
own people.  The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going  civil war.
External conflict - The  extemal  conflict  measure  is  an  assessment  both  of the  risk  to  the  incumbent
government and  to inward investment.  It ranges from trade  restrictions and embargoes,  whether  imposed
by a single country,  a group  of countries,  or the intemational  community  as a whole, through geopolitical
disputes, armed threats, exchanges of fire  on borders, border incursions,  foreign-supported  insurgency,  and
full-scale  warfare.
Corruption  - This covers  financial  corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes, but
places  more weight  on  actual  or potential  corruption  in the form of excessive  patronage,  nepotism, job
reservations,  'favor-for-favors',  secret  party  funding,  and  suspiciously  close  ties  between  politics  and
business.
Military in politics - This  measures the extent of the military's  involvement  in the  politics  of a  country,
including both the presence of a military regime,  and the risk of a military-takeover.
Religious Tensions - This measures tensions stemming  from the  domination of society  and/or governance
by a single  religious  group  that seeks  to replace  civil  law by religious  law  and to  exclude other religions
from the political and/or social process;  the desire of a single religious  group to dominate governance;  the
suppression off religious freedom;  and the desire of a religious group  to express  its own identity,  separate
from the country  as a whole.  These tensions  lead to the  risk  of inappropriate  policies,  civil dissent,  and
possible civil war.
Law and order  - This is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system  together  with an
assessment of the degree of popular observance of the law.
Ethnic tensions - This component  measures  the degree  of tension within a  country attributable  to racial,
nationality, or language divisions.
Democratic  accountability -This  is a measure of how responsive  government is to its people, on the basis
that the  less responsive it is, the more  likely it is  that the  government will fall, peacefully  in a  democratic
society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one.
Bureaucracy  quality - The  institutional strength  and  quality  of the  bureaucracy  is  another shock absorber
that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments  change.  Therefore,  high points are given  to
countries where  the bureaucracy  has  the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes  in policy
or interruptions  in government
Note  that prior  to  August  1997,  13  components  instead  of 12  were  reported,  with the  Internal  Conflict
component being subdivided into separate  components measuring Political Violence and the threat of Civil
War.  We opted to use the current categorization,  adjusting the historical series  accordingly,  as our focus is
on a working model for current and future use, for which only the 12 categories  are available.
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